Apex did not buy cameras. It bought a subscription to a platform, and the platform is not finished changing. Here is what is on the poles today, what one unit records, what the vendor sells as the next line item, and who actually decides which of those switches are on. It is not the Town Council, and it never was.
This comes straight off the Order Form in the Flock Safety master agreement obtained by public records request. Not a summary, the line items.
| Line item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Flock Safety Falcon | 5 units. The fixed, pole-mounted, solar-powered plate reader. This is the one you see on a street. |
| Flock Safety Falcon Flex | 5 units. Battery-powered and relocatable, no external power needed. APD told Council it has 3 undeployed "flex" cameras, reducing to 2 for special-event use. |
| FlockOS | Included. The dashboard and mapping layer that ties devices, alerts and searches together. |
| Flock Safety Advanced Search | $2,500 a year. This is the paid add-on that widens what an operator can search on. |
| Implementation | $350 per camera, 5 cameras, $1,750 one time. |
| Retention | 30 days. State law allows 90. |
| Term | 24-month initial term, 24-month renewal term. |
| Cost | $35,000 a year recurring. $71,750 total on the face of the contract. |
APD told Council on June 9 that 7 cameras are installed, that they are fixed and cannot be remotely rotated, that they are aimed into traffic lanes to photograph the rear of passing vehicles, and that the department does not disclose their locations. The department also stated the system averages about 60,000 plate reads per day.
Flock does not publish a component list. An independent teardown by the Center for Human Rights and Privacy identified these parts in a Falcon unit. Their unit was an older revision, so treat this as the family of components rather than a guarantee of what is on a 2025 pole in Apex.
| Component | Identified part |
|---|---|
| Lens and sensor | 5 MP, 16 mm fixed, M12 mount, 1/2 inch, infrared filter |
| Battery | Lithium-ion, 10.8 V, 19 Ah, about 205 Wh |
| Cellular | NimbeLink Skywire LTE modem. Data leaves by cellular, not by any town network. |
| GPS | Taoglas active patch antenna module |
| Wireless | 802.11 a/b/g/n/ac plus Bluetooth module |
| Compute | Lantronix Open-Q 624A system on module, doing the plate reading on the device |
| Trigger | Motion detection sensor with infrared LEDs |
Each trigger produces a set of still images and a structured record. From APD's presentation and Flock's own product description, one pass of one camera yields:
APD says the cameras do not photograph occupants and cannot be searched by person, name or address. Both statements are consistent with what the product does. The camera is aimed at the back of the car.
This is not facial recognition, and APD has not claimed it is. Skip past that argument, because it is the one the department wants to have. A plate is tied to a registered owner. A plate plus a timestamp plus a camera location, repeated across thousands of cameras and held by a private company, is a record of where you were and when. Do that to 74,000 people who were never asked, 60,000 times a day, and the absence of a face is not a comfort. It is a technicality.
Hardware is the boring half. The searching is where the system becomes a surveillance tool, and Apex bought the paid add-on that widens it.
We do not have to speculate about how it is used here. APD's own Organization Audit, produced in August 2026, records 2,649 searches by Apex operators between June 1 and August 17, and it includes the filter each operator applied. Real examples from that file:
Sedan, Nissan, whiteSedan, Coupe, Convertible, Hatchback, Wagon, silver_greySemi_Truck, whitenorth_carolina, applied to 1,208 searchesmichigan, virginiaTwo things follow. Attribute search is not a brochure feature here, it is in routine use: an operator can ask the network for every white Nissan sedan, no plate required. And the state filters show searches deliberately scoped to other states, which is a choice about reach, not a default.
The same file shows the search types: 1,846 lookups, 620 searches, and 183 run from the mobile app. The median search reached 2,298 networks. The largest reached 6,586.
Apex sets a 30-day retention window. Residents have been told that number as though it describes the life of the data. It does not. It describes how long Apex can look. Flock's own legal documents describe a different arrangement, and they are worth quoting exactly.
“Customer hereby grants to Flock a limited, non-exclusive, royalty-free, irrevocable, perpetual, worldwide licence to (a) use and disclose Customer Data to provide the Flock Services; and (b) use Customer Data to support and improve Flock's products and services.”
Quoted on Flock's own Data Ownership page, last updated August 21, 2026.
Read the two clocks side by side. Apex's access to its own footage ends after 30 days, and Flock's own summary confirms the customer can reach the data only “during the applicable Retention Period.” The rights Apex handed Flock are perpetual and irrevocable. Those are not the same clock, and only one of them was presented to Council.
“Flock uses a fraction of LPR images (less than one percent), which are stripped of all metadata and identifying information, solely for the purpose of improving Flock Services through machine learning.”
So the answer to “does Flock keep pictures of our cars” is yes, by their own written policy. Apex PD averages about 60,000 reads a day. One percent of that is 600 images a day, roughly 219,000 a year from this town alone, feeding a private company's models. That is arithmetic on Flock's own stated ceiling, not a count of Apex images, and Flock says the images are stripped of identifying data first. It is still your car, photographed on your street, retained and used by a vendor for a purpose no resident was asked about and no council voted on.
The Data Ownership page defines Customer Data, the thing that perpetual licence covers, as including:
That third line matters more than it looks. Search reasons, case numbers, custom hot lists, anything an Apex officer types, and anything Apex's other systems hand over, all sit inside the same perpetual licence as the photographs.
From the same LPR policy: “LPR data is hard deleted on a rolling 7-day basis by default; this may be increased or decreased on a case-by-case basis if a different schedule is required by a customer's law or policy.” The Chief has repeatedly presented 30 days as restraint, a third of what state law allows. Against the vendor's default it is more than four times as long. Apex did not accept a limit here. It asked for more than the standard.
This is not our inference. These are two documents on Flock's website right now.
| Data Ownership page, August 21, 2026 | LPR Policy, June 30, 2026 |
|---|---|
| “Flock cannot share your data with law enforcement agencies, partner organizations, or any third party solely based on our own judgment. Any such sharing requires your direction. You are in control.” “All sharing is ‘off’ by default, and can only be initiated by you.” |
“Flock Safety may access, use, preserve and/or disclose the LPR data to law enforcement authorities, government officials, and/or third parties, if legally required to do so or if Flock has a good faith belief that such access, use, preservation or disclosure is reasonably necessary to comply with a legal process, enforce the agreement between Flock and the customer, or detect, prevent or otherwise address security, privacy, fraud or technical issues.” |
A good faith belief is Flock's own judgment. One page says Flock cannot act on its own judgment. The other reserves the right to. Both are current. A town that wants to know which one governs its residents' data has to ask, and Apex has not asked.
There is a third document to hold against the claim that “all sharing is off by default, and can only be initiated by you.” Apex's own Network Audit shows 9,700 searches by two federal accounts between January and April 2026, which the Chief later described as “errant” shares caught in an audit. Errant means nobody at APD believes they turned them on. Footnote4a reported in April that Flock restored direct FBI access after telling communities it had no federal contracts, and concluded: “Flock manages access to the network. Not the city. Not the PD.” Either sharing can only be switched on by the customer, or two federal agencies searched Apex cameras for three months without the customer switching anything on. Both cannot be true.
Garrett Langley, Flock's chief executive, sat for a sixteen-question interview with WDIV in Detroit on August 18, 2026. Read three of his answers against Flock's own legal documents.
| Langley, on the record, August 18 | Flock's own documents |
|---|---|
| “We don't sell the data. We don't own the data; our customers do.” | Ownership is not the question. Section 4.1 of the Customer Terms grants Flock an “irrevocable, perpetual, worldwide licence” to use and disclose Customer Data. You can own a thing and still have handed someone else permanent rights to use it. |
| “We don't work with ICE.” | Flock markets to Federal agencies as a named industry vertical on its own website. Footnote4a reported in April 2026 that Flock restored direct FBI access after telling communities it had no federal contracts. And Apex's own Network Audit logs 9,700 searches by federal accounts between January and April. |
| Asked what stops an officer who is also on a federal task force from pulling Flock data for federal partners: “We as a company don't tell police departments how to interact with federal authorities. There are policies. There are restrictions. There are internal rules for how task forces operate, and those are different from city to city.” | That is the exact mechanism documented in Apex. On October 21, 2025 an Apex officer searched the plate network with the stated reason “R. wanted by HSI for trafficking fentanyl.” HSI is a component of ICE. In the same interview the CEO says the company does not work with ICE and then says the officer route is none of the company's business. Both answers are in the same conversation. |
We have seen it claimed that Flock's chief executive admitted the company keeps data past the retention window. We have looked, and we cannot find him saying that. What he has said publicly, repeatedly and recently, is the opposite: that retention is the municipality's choice and that the data is deleted when the window closes. If you are going to argue with Flock, do not argue with a quote that does not exist. Argue with the three things the company has written down instead.
That is the argument that survives a hostile reading. “They secretly keep everything” does not, and the moment it is said out loud the department gets to spend the meeting correcting you instead of answering for 9,700 federal searches.
The important thing about this system is not what it does today. It is that what it does tomorrow is a purchasing decision and a settings change, and neither one requires a vote in this town. The original deployment never got one.
Read Flock's own product comparison, on Flock's own website, describing what separates it from competitors:
“50+ iterations over 8 years, including LPR Pro. Continuously updated at no additional cost.”
Flock Safety, LPR product page, comparing itself to vendors with “paid-for upgrade programs”
That is the sales pitch, and it is also the problem stated out loud. The capability set on the poles outside your neighbourhood is not fixed by anything Apex signed. It is updated remotely, continuously, by a company in Atlanta, at no additional cost and therefore with no new purchase order, no council agenda item, and no notice to you.
Every item below is a current Flock product, sold on the same platform Apex already subscribes to. Flock packages the lot as a “Safe City Subscription”: “One contract. One invoice. Get cost-effective access to every Flock solution today.”
| Product | What it adds |
|---|---|
| Flock Video Cameras | Actual video surveillance, with AI analytics and searchable recordings. This is separate hardware from the plate readers, and it is sold from the same dashboard Apex already has. |
| Audio and gunshot detection | Microphones on poles, listening for gunfire, street takeovers and crashes. |
| Drone as First Responder | An automated drone launched to incidents. Apex Council was handed a four-year Axon drone software amendment on the August 11 consent agenda, with no dollar figure on the motion, and pulled it only because the room was full. |
| Flock FreeForm | Natural-language search across video and plate data. Flock's own comparison table says FreeForm “enables proactive and reactive search and alerts through natural language input.” Proactive means the system watches for a description you typed, and tells someone when it sees it. |
| Vehicle Signature | Flock says it “can recognize thousands of unique vehicle characteristics.” Your car is identifiable with no plate at all. |
| Mobile security trailers | Coverage anywhere, with no permits and no wiring, which means no visible procurement moment either. |
| Flock911 | Live 911 call streams shared across neighbouring agencies. |
| National LPR Network | Already on. Apex's own sharing snapshots show the statewide and nationwide networks Enabled. |
Flock's LPR page makes specific commitments. Two of them are worth holding up against documented events from this year.
| Flock says | What happened |
|---|---|
| “Local agency data control. Agency owns and controls.” | Flock, not the agency, holds the switch for federal access. Footnote4a reported on April 23, 2026 that Flock restored direct FBI access after telling communities it had no federal contracts, and put it plainly: “Flock manages access to the network. Not the city. Not the PD.” Meanwhile Flock markets to Federal agencies as a named vertical. |
| “Facial recognition. Not included. Not planned.” | Possibly true today. It is a marketing sentence, not a contract term, and it is the same company that cut default retention by blog post on August 13 and grandfathered existing customers like Apex at 30 days. A promise a vendor can revise in a post is not a safeguard. |
| “Customers control their own data retention and sharing settings.” | Apex's control produced 9,700 federal searches of its cameras between January and April, which the Chief later described as two “errant” shares, and roughly 3,000 outside organisations querying Apex cameras every month. |
This is the whole argument in one table. Every protection anyone has offered residents of this town, on retention, on federal exclusion, on facial recognition, on who is in the network, exists as a setting in a private company's product, changeable by that company or by a police chief, and never once put to a vote here.
APD will not publish the locations, so residents have been mapping them. If you want to know what is on your route:
The DeFlock crowdsourced map plots reported ALPR locations nationwide, including around Apex, and Finding Flock and this spotting guide have photographs of installed units from several angles. If you photograph one in Apex, send it to contact@deflockapex.org and we will publish it here with credit. We would rather show you the actual poles in this town than a vendor's product shot.
DeFlock Apex is a resident-led project. Everything here is sourced, and if a detail is wrong we want to know which one. contact@deflockapex.org