DeFlock Apex is a resident-led campaign to remove Flock and ban ALPR surveillance cameras, demand full disclosure of the sharing network, and require public approval before any surveillance technology can be considered in Apex.
Independent resident-led advocacy project. Built from public records, council materials, and direct civic engagement.
Council voted unanimously to send ALPR policy to the Public Safety Committee. The 10-camera expansion contract is unsigned. This is the window. Demand the committee meet in open session, with public comment and real debate, not a closed-door decision. Keep the pressure on your Council members now, before the committee meets.
Email your Council membersNot a live feed. Projected from APD’s own stated rate of 60,000 plate reads a day and the 1,700 hotlist hits they reported to Council. See the math →
APD told Council the cameras are already “reducing crime,” but presented no crime trend to prove it. Here is that trend, built entirely from the FBI’s own data. Apex bought its first cameras in 2023, at the lowest crime levels the town has ever recorded.
No ALPR vote is scheduled for August 11. The policy is sitting in Public Safety Committee review. Public comment is how residents stay on the record before any contract gets signed.
Every square below is a thousand plate reads. All ten cases fit inside one of them.
At APD’s own stated rate of 60,000 reads a day, the cameras have logged more than 14 million plate reads. Fourteen million photographs of residents’ cars, with time and location, in a town of 74,000 people. When Council asked what all of it produced, APD named about ten cases, with no case numbers and no court outcomes. Fourteen million squares will not fit on a screen, so each square below is a thousand reads. The circled one is where all ten cases would sit.
One thousand plate reads. The ten red dots are the ten cases. Every grey dot is somebody who was photographed, logged, and made searchable for driving to work.
The 60,000 reads a day is APD’s figure, stated to Council on June 9. The ten cases are APD’s, from the same presentation. Divide one by the other and it takes roughly 1.4 million scans to produce a single case the department is willing to put in front of the public. Separately, an independent audit of APD’s logs counts 15,335 operator searches over eleven months, each one a deliberate act by a person. We are not asking anyone to take our word for any of this. Every input is the department’s own number.
ATM jackpotting, burglary, fentanyl, wanted felons, auto theft, retail theft. Presented with no incident numbers, no arrest reports, no case references, no court outcomes. A resident cannot check a single one. Read the analysis →
The log does not look like a department responding to crime
APD’s hotlist hits get the headlines. The searches are the part nobody talks about, and they are the part where a human being makes a choice. An independent audit of APD’s own logs shows who ran those searches and when.
Of every day of the week, Sunday draws the most plate searches. Searching also runs through the night, with activity recorded in the 2 AM and 3 AM hours. A department reacting to incidents would track the pattern of incidents. This tracks the pattern of somebody with time on their hands.
Nine separate days show volume more than two standard deviations above normal. The largest single day approaches 1,500 searches, roughly 25 times a typical day. Nobody has explained what happened on those days, and Council has never asked.
One account logged 919 searches across 20 of 24 hours. Another was active in 18 of 24. No human works those hours. That pattern is what shared credentials look like, though there are other possible explanations, including scheduled queries or genuinely irregular shift work. APD is the only party that can say which it is, and it has not been asked.
Here is why it matters. APD’s entire accountability story rests on the audit log: every search is attributable to a named officer with a stated reason. If three accounts are being shared, then for those searches the log records a login, not a person. The oversight is only as real as the identity behind the account, and right now nobody outside the department can confirm there is one.
Figures above come from an independent audit of Apex PD’s search logs covering July 29, 2025 to June 29, 2026. The 61.1 daily average is calculated across days with recorded activity, not calendar days. The uniform-activity finding is a statistical flag that calls for an explanation, not a proven allegation against any individual, which is why no operator is named here. Independent search records are at haveibeenflocked.com. See our full audit page →
Why is our police department doing marketing for a surveillance company?
Apex records 39 violent offenses a year and zero murders. In a town like this, a police department has very little it needs to justify. Instead, over the last several months, APD has run a sustained public campaign for a private vendor’s product. This is the documented record.
Told Council the program is “already reducing crime, increasing apprehensions/prosecutions, deterring criminal actors.” The presentation contained no crime trend, no before-and-after comparison, no methodology, no control, and no external research.
Read the analysis →Presented six success stories, including ATM jackpotting, fentanyl, and auto theft, with no incident numbers, no case references, no court outcomes and no prosecution results. Nothing a resident or Council member can check.
Read the analysis →Repeated the phrase “suspects not from Apex” throughout the examples section, where the origin of a suspect was never necessary to explain how the technology functioned. The effect is a story about imported crime.
Read the analysis →Posted a single arrest to Facebook as justification for the entire program, compared plate surveillance to owning a smartphone, and pinned a disclaimer about “bots and inauthentic accounts” after opposition outnumbered support in the department’s own comment section.
See the post →The Chief told Council in January there was no federal sharing. Public records produced in March showed two federal relationships, the US Postal Inspector’s Office and the USAFB Police Department.
See the records →He told Council exactly that on June 9, and said he would research alternatives. A department with no attachment to a vendor does not usually spend months making that vendor’s case in public.
Every item above substitutes persuasion for evidence. Anecdotes without case numbers. A claim of reduced crime without a trend line. A story about outsiders. If the results existed, the results would be the argument.
Public trust is the one thing a police department cannot buy, budget for, or requisition. It is spending that trust to defend a contract with a company valued in the billions, in one of the safest towns in America, for a system that scanned millions of cars to point at ten cases it will not let anyone verify. Residents are entitled to ask what that trade was worth, and who it was for.
This isn't just Apex
Residents across North Carolina are organizing to remove Flock and ban ALPR mass surveillance. Hillsborough, Chatham County and Pittsboro have already cut their contracts, and more than 80 localities nationwide had dropped Flock by May 2026. Independent resident campaigns from the Triangle to the coast are linking up, comparing public records, and holding the same line: no warrantless tracking of everyone, all the time. As of July 2026 the fight has a new front in the state capital.
DeFlock Raleigh · the state capital
Raleigh PD has run at least 32 Flock cameras since 2022, installed on a federal grant that never went to a Council vote. One single RPD search reached more than 76,000 devices across 6,200 networks. “ICE” appears in their own search logs. No sitting Council member has taken a public position.
DeFlockILM · Wilmington & New Hanover County
The resident campaign mapping every Flock camera in the Wilmington area, built on public records and a statewide records hub. Sign the petition, email leaders, read the documents.
DeFlockNC.org
The statewide group tracking Flock across North Carolina, from Granville County to the coast. Maps, records, and the fight in towns like ours.
DeFlock.org
The national project mapping ALPR cameras across the country. It powers the camera map on this site and connects local campaigns coast to coast.
Updates
Residents filled the Council chamber on August 11 and the town opened overflow seating on the third floor. Eight residents spoke against surveillance technology. One spoke in favor. Before public forum began, Council pulled item CN4 off the consent agenda and referred it to the Public Safety Committee. ABC and CBS covered the meeting, and Steve Burke of Gamers Nexus spoke during public forum. Read the recap →
Item CN4 on tomorrow night's Council agenda adds a police drone program and an interview room camera system to the town's Axon contract, and extends that contract to June 30, 2030. It sits on the consent agenda, which passes in one motion with no discussion unless a Council member asks for it to be pulled. Apex has no drone ordinance, no published use policy, and no retention rule. We have not seen the contract, so the dollar amount, drone count, and program scope are unknown the night before the vote. That is the problem. Read the full breakdown →
Correction, August 12: CN4 added Axon Air DroneSense software and an interview room system for a drone capability APD already has. It was not a purchase of aircraft. The four-year term, the missing dollar figure, and the absence of any drone ordinance stand. Corrected page.
DeFlock Raleigh is live, and the pattern we documented in Apex turns out to be the pattern in the state capital. Raleigh PD has operated at least 32 Flock cameras since 2022, paid for by a federal grant that never required a Council vote. On November 1, 2022 the Chief told Council about the program under an agenda item titled “Comments Made.” No motion. No vote. Not one question asked. A single RPD search reached more than 76,000 devices across 6,200 networks. “ICE” is logged as the stated reason for at least two searches, even though RPD’s governing directive never mentions immigration at all. Their annual audit goes to the Chief of Police and nobody else. Two towns, one vendor, the same playbook: install first, tell Council later, call the vendor’s settings a policy. Apex is not an isolated case, and neither is Raleigh. See the coalition →
We pulled the FBI’s numbers for Apex back to 2011. As the town nearly doubled in size, the crime rate fell about 40 percent. Apex bought its first Flock cameras in 2023, at the lowest crime levels the town has ever recorded. Whatever made Apex safe, it was not the cameras. The next council meeting is Tuesday, August 11, and no ALPR vote is scheduled, which is exactly why the record matters now. See the chart →
DeFlock Apex is now allied with DeFlockILM, the resident campaign fighting Flock in Wilmington and New Hanover County, and with the national DeFlock network. Separate local fights are becoming one statewide push to remove Flock and ban ALPR mass surveillance. Chatham County and Pittsboro have already ended their contracts; campaigns from the Triangle to the coast are now comparing public records and coordinating. See who we stand with →
The Supreme Court ruled 6-3 in Chatrie v. United States that geofence warrants are a "search" under the Fourth Amendment. Justice Kagan, writing for the majority: individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in cell phone location records, even when held by a third party, even for a limited time. The ruling extends Carpenter's erosion of the third-party doctrine to location data disclosed voluntarily. This directly supports Section 6.06 of DeFlock Apex's proposed ordinance, which prohibits geofence-style queries against ALPR data. Combined with the January 2026 Norfolk ruling, the legal trajectory for warrantless, consent-free ALPR network participation is increasingly difficult to defend. The Court remanded for a "reasonableness" analysis, so the search may still be upheld on those facts, but the constitutional principle is now settled: location data from a third-party tech company is protected. SCOTUSblog →
Apex Police posted a single ALPR arrest on Facebook to justify the entire surveillance program. Three people with property crime warrants were picked up near NC 55. That is one anecdote, not evidence. Every peer-reviewed study that has tested the claim that ALPR reduces crime found no significant reduction. The comment section reversed: opposition now outnumbers support on APD's own page. APD's pinned disclaimer about "bots and inauthentic accounts" was widely mocked. Multiple commenters independently called the post AI-written or propaganda. APD compared ALPR to your smartphone to deflect from the fact that a government agency with arrest power is tracking residents without a warrant. Facebook post · Read the peer-reviewed evidence →
DeFlock Apex meets with the Police Chief and Town Manager to discuss surveillance policy, guardrails, and the path forward.
Chief Johansen defended ALPR technology at length but did not defend Flock, telling Council he has no attachment to the vendor and would research alternatives. Several Council members separated the technology from the vendor and voiced specific concerns about Flock. Council voted unanimously to refer ALPR policy and program updates to the Public Safety Committee, the first step in a formal review tied to the contract decision ahead. The Town also confirmed it has not signed the pending contract for 10 additional cameras. Watch the full meeting →
APD presents to Town Council. Key disclosures: the two March federal agencies were the US Postal Inspector's Office and the USAFB Police Department, called "errant" shares "caught/cleared in audit." Federal agencies are now automatically excluded by Flock's default settings. APD claims 0 federal agencies currently, 0 searches for immigration or abortion enforcement, and 0 policy violations. What was not disclosed: when federal access began, who approved it, what those agencies queried. The presentation also claims ALPR is "already reducing crime" with no trend data, before/after comparison, or independent evidence. Read our full analysis →
Mayor Jacques K. Gilbert called DeFlock Apex and acknowledged resident concerns. In a written statement, he said he supports ALPR as a law enforcement tool (citing 29 years as a police officer), wants multi-layered safeguards and accountability through policy, and plans to meet with Chief Johansen to gather more information. He has not publicly stated a position on Flock, but is aware of the problems with the system. See the Mayor's statement →
The FBI has published an RFP seeking $36 million for nationwide access to license plate reader data, with Flock named as one of the few vendors that could fulfill the contract. The system would cover all 50 states with near real-time alerts. The RFP is for the FBI's Directorate of Intelligence. Ars Technica · 404 Media
DeFlock Apex will meet with the Town Manager and the Police Chief to discuss policy and transparency portals.
A California class action lawsuit alleges Home Depot uses Flock Safety cameras in its parking lots to capture every vehicle’s license plate, make, model, and location, feeding the data into a searchable database accessible to law enforcement nationwide. The complaint names Flock directly and details incidents where Flock secretly re-enabled “nationwide” sharing settings without authorization. Apex PD already has a signed access agreement for Lowe’s Flock cameras (July 2024) — the identical retail-to-law-enforcement pipeline now facing litigation. ClassAction.org · Read complaint →
Public records dump reveals 994 Flock sharing relationships in March (2 federal), growing to 1,070 in April (federal removed). Records also show private-camera sharing and outside hot-list sharing. Full findings below.
DeFlock Apex launches.
Pittsboro Commissioners vote to end Flock. July 1 removal deadline.
Chatham County ends Flock contract. First Triangle municipality to terminate.
Apex Police Chief presents Flock to Council. System live ~90 days, 10 cameras.
Where do residents stand?
Cast your vote. Results are shown after voting.
A year ago, a single search reached under 1,000. Today it reaches up to 6,896 networks and 100,075 cameras, nearly seven times more. Private cameras and outside hot lists are part of the network. This is not a limited local tool.
The research is in. ALPR doesn't reduce crime.
Peer-reviewed studies find no significant crime reduction from automated license plate readers. Three rigorous evaluations, a full-coverage barrier island study, and a Cambridge Journal of Evidence-Based Policing review all point the same direction. The page also covers displacement, diminishing returns, and why the privacy concerns are properties of the technology itself, not any single vendor.
Read the full evidence brief →Camera locations near Apex
Data by DeFlock. Know of a camera? Report it.
Can't see it? Open DeFlock Maps directly.
Based on APD's June 9, 2026 Council presentation
What APD claims
These are direct claims from the presentation. For each one, here is what APD provided—and what was missing.
| What APD claims | What was provided |
|---|---|
| ALPR is already reducing crime | No crime trend data. No before/after comparison. No methodology. No external research. |
| 60,000 vehicle reads per day | Volume statistic only. No false positive rate, no search logs, no policy compliance audit. |
| 1,700+ hotlist hits | No breakdown of how many led to enforcement, arrests, or prosecution. No error rate. |
| Program solved ATM jackpotting, fentanyl trafficking, auto theft, and other cases | Anecdotes only. No incident numbers, no case references, no court outcomes. Cannot be independently verified. |
| Federal sharing has been removed | The March 2026 snapshot shows two federal agencies with access (US Postal Inspector’s Office, USAFB Police Department). The April snapshot shows “No Federal.” APD called them “errant” shares “caught/cleared in audit.” No documentation of when federal access was originally approved, who approved it, what those agencies searched while they had access, or what specifically prevents re-enabling it. “Errant” means either someone approved access they shouldn’t have, or the system granted it without approval. Neither scenario has been investigated or documented publicly. |
| The program has civilian oversight | The “civilian oversight” is the Office of Professional Standards: one person, the Police Professional Compliance Manager, a Town employee inside the APD structure. This individual approved the federal sharing arrangement. This individual approved the sharing network configuration. This individual is the entirety of the oversight. Every model surveillance ordinance in the country (ACLU, EFF, San Diego, San Francisco, Washington State) requires an independent civilian board of 3, 5, or 7 members with no Town employees, no law enforcement ties, and no vendor affiliations. Apex has one staffer who approved the things now being questioned. |
This is not a claim that APD's statements are false. It is an observation that none of them can be independently verified from the materials provided. Read the full analysis →
Do the math.
APD says 60,000 vehicle reads per day. The system has been live roughly six months. Here is what that means.
Volume is not evidence of effectiveness. A system that reads 10.8 million plates to produce 10 unverifiable case anecdotes has not demonstrated that it works. It has demonstrated that it collects an enormous amount of data about people who have done nothing wrong.
Last updated: June 9, 2026
Where Council stands
Five Council members vote. The Mayor votes only to break a tie. Three lean toward removal — the minimum majority needed. Two seats remain in play. Note: some members who support removal oppose ALPR technology broadly; others support ALPR but want Flock specifically removed.
Mayor — votes only to break a tie
If a Council member believes their position is misstated, they can clarify it in writing and we will update the tracker.
Three of these seats face voters next
Apex holds municipal elections in odd years with staggered four-year terms. The next ballot is November 2027, and it fills three seats: Mayor Jacques K. Gilbert, Terry Mahaffey, and Arno Zegerman. Ed Gray, Sue Mu, and Shane Reese were elected on November 4, 2025 and do not face voters again until 2029. Whatever Council decides about surveillance, these three answer for it first.
Liking the technology in the abstract is not the test, and we are not asking anyone to be anti-police. The test is three votes.
- End the Flock contract. Do not renew or expand it.
- No new ALPR deployment until Apex adopts a binding surveillance ordinance.
- Support an ordinance requiring public notice, a privacy impact review, and a recorded Council vote before any surveillance technology goes up in this town.
Commit to those three and we have no quarrel with you. Refuse them and we will spend the next fifteen months organizing to make sure Apex voters know.
Supports removing Flock and is generally opposed to ALPR technology, not just this contract. The clearest standing commitment of the three.
Ask for a yes or no →Supports removing Flock but supports ALPR technology generally. He meets the first test. He has not said whether he would vote for a binding ordinance limiting future deployment.
Ask for a yes or no →Supports ALPR broadly, citing 29 years in law enforcement, and did not defend Flock specifically. Wants safeguards through policy rather than ordinance. Has not committed to any of the three votes.
Ask for a yes or no →Standings above are DeFlock Apex’s reading of the public record as of the June 9, 2026 meeting, not a recorded vote. Council’s only recorded ALPR vote was unanimous, to refer the policy to the Public Safety Committee. If a Council member believes their position is misstated, they can clarify it in writing and we will publish it here in full.
What you can do right now
Email Town Council
Pre-drafted message: remove Flock, no new ALPR until a real privacy debate. One tap.
Open pre-drafted email →Email the Town Manager
Randy Vosburg oversees the Police Department and the pending Flock contract. His office reads resident mail. One tap.
Email the Town Manager’s office →Attend the next Council meeting
2nd and 4th Tuesday, 6:00 PM. Apex Town Hall, 73 Hunter Street, 2nd Floor.
View Town calendar →Speak for three minutes
Sign in with Town Clerk Allen Coleman before the meeting. State your name and address.
Contact Town Clerk →Submit written comment
Email public.forum@apexnc.org by 3:00 PM on meeting day. Include name and address.
Submit written comment →Will you vote to remove Flock and block any new ALPR deployment until Apex has a real privacy debate?
What the new records show
From Flock sharing snapshots, search audit logs, and notification records produced via public records requests.
March 2026
April 2026
Mar→Apr
in 11 months
per search
no reason
March: 994 sharing relationships
A March 2026 snapshot shows 994 organizations in active sharing: 186 in-state, 808 out-of-state, 2 federal.
A system connected to hundreds of outside agencies is not a limited local tool. It is a network.
April: 1,070 sharing relationships — "No Federal"
April 2026 shows 1,070 organizations: 195 in-state, 875 out-of-state. Federal field: "No Federal."
The change from 2 federal to none requires explanation. Were shares removed? Recategorized? Did settings change after public scrutiny?
"No federal entities. Hard stop." vs. the record
On January 29, the Chief told Council Apex does not share with federal entities, naming FBI, DHS, and ICE. The March snapshot shows two federal sharing relationships.
At the June 9 Council presentation, APD acknowledged the two agencies (US Postal Inspector's Office and USAFB Police Department) and called them "errant" shares caught in an audit. But no one explained how they got approved when the stated policy was "no federal." No one disclosed what those agencies did with the access. No one explained why the January 29 assurance was categorical while the March record showed active federal shares.
Private camera sharing: MacGregor Downs
A Flock notice shows MacGregor Downs Country Club shared cameras with Apex PD, granting searchable footage access.
Private entity owns the camera, police gain searchable access. That is a different oversight problem.
Hot-list sharing: WakeMed and others
Records show outside agencies shared custom hot lists with Apex users, including WakeMed Campus PD, Whitestown IN PD, and Brevard County FL SO.
Residents deserve to know what lists Apex receives, who approves them, and whether sensitive-site lists generate local police attention.
The search log: 15,335 searches, most with no reason
Apex PD's own Flock search log shows at least 15,335 searches in 11 months. Each search now reaches up to 6,896 networks and 100,075 cameras nationwide, nearly seven times the reach of a year ago. 28% list no reason at all, the single most common entry.
This is not occasional, targeted use. It is constant, wide, and often unexplained access to a national tracking network, from a system the public never voted on.
A direct question for Council
On January 29, residents heard a categorical assurance. A March snapshot contradicted it. These eight questions were put to Council.
Update: APD's June 9, 2026 Council presentation answered questions 1, 5, and 6 — partially. Questions 2, 3, 4, 7, and 8 remain unanswered.
- ✓ Partially answered (June 9) — Which federal organizations? APD named US Postal Inspector's Office and USAFB Police Department.
- ✕ Unanswered — What permissions did they have?
- ✕ Unanswered — Who approved those relationships?
- ✕ Unanswered — When did access begin?
- ✓ Answered (June 9) — When was access removed? Before April 30. Flock now auto-excludes federal.
- ✓ Answered (June 9) — Why did April show "No Federal"? APD says caught in internal audit and cleared.
- ✕ Unanswered — Were any searches, exports, alerts, or hot-list interactions associated with federal users?
- ✕ Unanswered — Does Apex have audit logs proving the answer?
APD confirmed the agencies and confirmed they were removed. They have not disclosed what those agencies did while they had access. That is still owed.
What Apex must disclose before renewal or expansion
- × Full list of all organizations Apex shares Flock data with
- × Full list of all organizations whose data Apex can search
- ≈ Names of all federal entities shown in any Flock sharing snapshot (APD named 2 agencies at June 9 — full disclosure not published)
- × All private camera networks shared with Apex PD
- × All hot lists shared with Apex PD
- × All pending, approved, denied, and revoked share requests
- × Permission levels for each sharing relationship
- × Names or roles of users who approved sharing
- × Audit logs for searches, alerts, exports, downloads, and shared-network access
- × Written policy governing private-camera access
- × Written policy governing federal, fusion-center, and out-of-state sharing
- × Written policy governing custom hot lists
- × Records explaining the March-to-April federal discrepancy
Our asks to Apex Town Council
Cancel or decline renewal
End the Flock contract. Do not renew.
Reject any expansion
No additional cameras, no Flock OS, no live video, no private-camera network access.
Publish the records
Full sharing architecture, audit logs, private-camera agreements, and the federal discrepancy explanation.
Adopt a surveillance ordinance
Public notice, privacy impact review, competitive procurement, and Council approval before any future deployment.
133 agencies from 33 states asked to access Apex cameras. Why?
This is how the Flock network works. When a department joins, they don’t just share data outward — they receive inbound requests from agencies they’ve never met, in states they don’t govern, for purposes residents never agreed to. The table below is the list Apex received. Every entry is a public record. None of these requests required a public vote.
Hover a state to see agencies. North Carolina highlighted as the home state. States with no color had zero inbound requests to Apex.
| Date | Agency | State | Access Granted | Received By | Source |
|---|
Access types: Search = plate reads; HL = hot list alerts; VMS = video; An = analytics. Source documents available in the Documents section.
The audit log APD didn't show you
APD's presentation referenced an internal audit log. That log is maintained by Flock—the vendor whose contract is under review. HaveIBeenFlocked.com maintains an independent, public audit record of Apex PD's searches that is more comprehensive than anything APD has shared with Council.
APD's internal audit log is controlled by the same vendor whose contract is being evaluated. An audit you control is not an audit. This independent record is what Council should be reviewing.
What the independent audit data shows
These charts are drawn from the public audit record at HaveIBeenFlocked.com. None of this was in APD's Council presentation.
Source: HaveIBeenFlocked.com public audit database. APD has not published equivalent data.
Responsible Privacy Protection Policy for Apex
Remove Flock. No new ALPR until Apex has a real privacy debate. Some Council members support ALPR technology under the right conditions, so we drafted a full governance framework that would put any future system under strict civilian control, with real teeth. Apex got this right with the data center. This is what getting it right looks like for surveillance.
No ALPR without a public vote
Every deployment, renewal, vendor change, or capability upgrade requires 30 days public notice, a published Surveillance Impact Report, a public hearing, and a recorded Council vote. The police department has no independent authority to expand or renew.
99% accuracy or it doesn't go up
Any ALPR vendor must demonstrate a verified read accuracy rate of 99% or higher before deployment. North Carolina law (G.S. § 20-183.31(c)) requires maintenance and calibration records but sets no performance floor. This policy sets one. Industry studies show ALPR misread rates as high as 35%. A misread plate means a wrongful stop, a felony alert on the wrong car, a family pulled over at gunpoint. If the system can't meet 99%, it doesn't belong on Apex roads.
Your data is deleted in 10 days
All ALPR data is permanently and irreversibly deleted within 10 days of capture unless tied to a documented active felony investigation. No blanket data preservation. Flock's current Apex contract specifies 30 days. This cuts that by two-thirds.
No mass sharing networks
Apex cameras are removed from nationwide and statewide sharing networks entirely. No standing federal access. No passive sharing where outside agencies can query Apex data without Apex's knowledge. Any disclosure requires a written request, a documented active case, and supervisor approval.
A civilian committee with real authority
A 7-member Citizen ALPR Oversight Committee, appointed by Council, reviews all audits, approves or rejects sharing requests, investigates complaints, and can recommend immediate system suspension. No members may work for the Town, law enforcement, or any surveillance vendor.
Prohibited uses are written into law
The ordinance explicitly bans: traffic enforcement, immigration enforcement, monitoring protests or religious gatherings, predictive policing, behavioral analysis, and pattern-of-life tracking. Facial recognition, live video streaming, biometrics, and audio detection are permanently prohibited.
ALPR is the ceiling, not the floor
No expansion beyond license plate reading into any other surveillance category. No drones. No live video feeds. No audio detection or gunshot sensors. No facial recognition. No behavioral analytics. No predictive policing systems. ALPR vendors routinely bundle additional capabilities into their platforms and upsell after the initial contract. This policy draws a hard line: if Apex approves ALPR under strict conditions, that approval covers license plate reading and nothing else. Any new surveillance category requires its own full public review from scratch.
Annual audits and a right to sue
An independent third-party auditor reviews compliance every year. Results are published in full. Any resident harmed by a violation can bring a civil action in North Carolina state court and recover attorneys' fees. Enforcement doesn't depend on the willingness of Town officials to act.
We drafted this ordinance in full. It is grounded in NC General Statutes, Carpenter v. United States, and model legislation from the ACLU, EFF, Washington State, and California. It is ready for Council introduction.
Read the full ordinance (PDF) →This is not just about cameras.
Automated License Plate Readers are AI-powered cameras that capture every passing vehicle, storing plate number, make, model, color, location, direction, and timestamp. Flock's own materials describe a "public safety operating system" with searchable records, live video, audio detection, and national sharing networks.
The question is not whether a camera can help solve a crime. The question is whether Apex has made an honest, evidence-based, publicly accountable case for joining a searchable vehicle-surveillance network. For more: ACLU | EFF
Why you should be concerned
ALPRs do not reduce crime
Flock's claim that 10% of U.S. crime is solved using their technology was conducted by Flock employees. One academic overseer has since expressed concerns. Independent research in the Journal of Experimental Criminology found no significant deterrent effect. Less than 0.3% of hits in Piedmont, CA translated into a useful lead.
ALPRs are a major security risk
- November 2025: Flock logins found for sale on Russian hacking forums. No MFA required.
- January 2025: Motorola ALPR system had a critical flaw allowing anyone to access live data.
- July 2025: Flock exposed a misconfigured demo revealing internal tools and API keys.
ALPRs are dragnet surveillance
Over 99.7% of plates recorded belong to people not on any hot list. Flock's own transparency portals confirm this.
ALPRs are routinely abused
- Texas police tracked a woman who had an abortion across state lines.
- A Kansas officer stalked his estranged wife using Flock.
- An Ohio officer stalked his ex-girlfriend via ALPRs.
ALPR usage leads to dangerous encounters
- A San Francisco woman pulled from her car at gunpoint over a plate error.
- Colorado police terrorized a Black family, including children, over a misidentified vehicle.
ALPRs result in racist policing
In Oak Park, IL, 84% of Flock-triggered stops in the first 10 months were of Black drivers. The EFF found Oakland PD cameras disproportionately scanned communities with higher densities of Black and brown residents.
ALPRs put undocumented people at risk
ICE taps into Flock's nationwide camera network. Departments that pledged not to share with ICE have been caught doing so.
Source documents
All documents below were obtained through public records requests to the Town of Apex. PDFs are unaltered originals.
Sharing snapshots
March 2026 Sharing Snapshot
994 organizations. 186 in-state, 808 out-of-state, 2 federal.
April 2026 Sharing Snapshot
1,070 organizations. 195 in-state, 875 out-of-state. "No Federal."
Camera and hot-list sharing
MacGregor Downs Camera Share
Private Flock cameras shared with Apex PD for searchable access.
WakeMed Hot List Share
WakeMed Campus PD shared a custom hot list.
Whitestown IN PD Hot List
Out-of-state hot list shared with Apex users.
Brevard County FL SO Hot List
Out-of-state hot list shared with Apex users.
Contracts and procurement
Flock Contract & PO (2025)
LPR cameras and software contract and purchase order.
Flock Safety MSA FY23-25
Master services agreement.
Flock Safety 2023-020
Original 2023 Flock procurement document.
Town Purchase Order (July 2023)
Purchase order from the initial 2023 deal.
Flock 2026-0476
2026 Flock procurement document.
Contract Routing Status
Internal contract routing, January 2025.
Flock Funding (Dec 2024)
Funding documentation.
Funding Discussion (Jan 2025)
Redacted for attorney-client privilege.
Lowe's Flock Letter (July 2024)
Letter requesting access to Lowe's Flock/LiveView cameras.
Pending share requests (16 documents)
Flock notifications showing pending camera share requests involving Apex PD.
Pending Request 1
View document
Pending Request 2
View document
Pending Request 3
View document
Pending Request 4
View document
Pending Request 5
View document
Pending Request 6
View document
Pending Request 7
View document
Pending Request 8
View document
Pending Request 9
View document
Pending Request 10
View document
Pending Request 11
View document
Pending Request 12
View document
Pending Request 13
View document
Pending Request 14
View document
Pending Request 15
View document
Pending Request 16
View document
Additional documents will be posted as they are processed. All originals obtained via NC Public Records Act requests.
Frequently asked questions
Are we saying Apex shared data with ICE?
No. APD's June 9, 2026 presentation identified the two federal agencies as the US Postal Inspector's Office and the USAFB Police Department. Neither is ICE. But the relevant questions remain: what data did those agencies access, when did the relationship begin, and who approved it when the stated policy was "no federal"?
Are we saying the Chief lied?
The record shows a contradiction. The Chief said no federal sharing on January 29. The March snapshot showed two. At the June 9 presentation, APD acknowledged the agencies and called them "errant" shares caught in an audit. That is an admission the record was real. What APD has not explained is how two federal sharing relationships got approved under a stated "no federal" policy, or what those agencies did while they had access.
Does WakeMed mean Apex can search hospital cameras?
Not based on the current record. The WakeMed document appears to involve a hot list, not camera access. It still raises questions about outside watch lists and sensitive institutions.
What is the private-camera concern?
MacGregor Downs shows private cameras being shared with Apex PD for searchable access. Private ownership blurs public accountability.
Why does nationwide sharing matter?
Local oversight weakens as the network grows. Apex Council can oversee Apex PD. It cannot oversee hundreds of outside agencies unless Apex discloses the full sharing architecture.
Is this anti-police?
No. This is about accountability for a specific surveillance technology. Police had investigative tools before Flock. The question is whether mass warrantless tracking is necessary, proportionate, and properly overseen.
Does Flock solve crimes?
Flock's own study was conducted by employees. Independent research found no deterrent effect and less than 0.3% of hits translated into useful leads. The question is whether mass collection is justified by the evidence.
Why isn't 30-day retention enough?
Thirty days is enough to reconstruct commute patterns, identify associations, and track sensitive visits. The issue is mass collection without suspicion, warrant, or oversight.
What should Apex do instead?
Targeted investigations with warrants. Improved infrastructure. Community policing. Any future surveillance technology should require public notice, review, audits, and a Council vote.
Didn't nearby communities end their Flock contracts?
Yes. Chatham County (April 2026) and Pittsboro (May 2026) both ended Flock after sustained resident advocacy.
Similar projects and tools
DeFlockILM (Wilmington, NC)
Our partner campaign fighting Flock in Wilmington and New Hanover County. Public records, petition, talking points, and a statewide records hub.
ACLU: Get The Flock Out Toolkit
The ACLU's national advocacy toolkit for fighting Flock and ALPR cameras. Model legislation, organizing playbook, sample letters to reps.
ACLU Model ALPR Bill
Model legislation limiting retention to hours, restricting sharing to warrant-backed felony investigations only.
Have I Been Flocked?
Check if your plate has been searched in Flock's system.
FlockHopper
Get directions that avoid ALPR cameras.
Upcoming Meetings
Find public meetings about ALPR deployments.
Eyes On Flock
Dashboard tracking Flock usage patterns.
Suspected Locations
Map of suspected ALPR locations from FOIA and other sources.
Atlas of Surveillance
EFF's database of law enforcement surveillance tech.
Plate Privacy
Institute for Justice's ALPR usage analysis.
Pittsboro Cameras
The campaign that ended Flock in Pittsboro, NC.
Key links
Get involved
Want to help, attend a meeting, or stay informed?
Sign up to get involvedOnly used to coordinate advocacy. No tracking, no spam.